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I. INTRODUCTION
Wyoming case law treats pro se pleadings in conflicting fashion.1 Precedent
dictates both that courts hold pro se litigants to the same standards as attorneys

* J.D. candidate, University of Wyoming College of Law, Class of 2019. I would like to
thank The Honorable Judge Tori R.A. Kricken of the Second Judicial District Court of the State of
Wyoming for the invaluable assistance in research and development of this comment. I would also
like to thank The Honorable Judge John G. Fenn of the Fourth Judicial District Court of the State
of Wyoming for piquing my interest in the difficulties judges face regarding pro se pleadings.
1

See infra notes 63 – 81 and accompanying text.
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and that courts award pro se litigants leniency in their pleadings.2 Statements such
as, “[w]e remain committed to the rule that this court will not apply different
procedural standards for pro se parties than we do for represented parties”3 and
“[a]s a pro se litigant, [appellant] was entitled to some leniency in the stringent
standards applied to attorneys”4 directly conflict with one another. This second
line of cases requires only that courts treat pro se pleadings leniently, without
specifically describing the level of leniency courts should grant.5 This comment
intends to persuade the Wyoming Supreme Court to affirm the second line of
cases regarding leniency and specifically overrule contrary cases.6 In addition,
for purposes of consistency and uniformity, the court should introduce a factor
approach to aid trial courts in determining when to grant pro se litigants leniency
and the appropriate level of leniency for each situation.7 This approach would be
equitable and beneficial for judges, appellate review, the parties, and those the
litigation has the potential to affect.8
Part I of this comment introduces the issues regarding inconsistencies in
precedent.9 Part II outlines the scope of this comment as focused through the
lens of a family law litigant.10 Family law is an appropriate extended example of
the quandaries facing pro se parties because these litigants, often unrepresented,
encounter unique, difficult, and socially important issues.11 Part III addresses the
two contradictory lines of cases, introduced above, concerning the treatment of
pro se litigants.12 Under one line of cases, the Wyoming Supreme Court requires
pro se litigants to act as a similarly situated competent attorney.13 Under the other,
2
Compare Libretti v. State (In re U.S. Currency Totaling $7,209.00), 2012 WY 75, ¶ 31, 278
P.3d 234, 241 (Wyo. 2012) (identifying that pro se litigants are afforded leniency from the stringent
standards required by attorneys), and MTM v. State (In re KD), 26 P.3d 1035, 1036 (Wyo. 2001)
(noting that “some allowances are made for pro se litigants”), with RM v. Dep’t of Family Servs.
(In re KMM), 957 P.2d 296, 298 (Wyo. 1998) (remaining committed to the proposition that the
same procedural standards are applied to pro se litigants as are applied to those with representation),
and In re GP, 679 P.2d 976, 984 (Wyo. 1984) (recognizing that pro se litigants will not receive any
benefit based on their failure to obtain counsel).
3

In re KMM, 957 P.2d at 298.

4

In re U.S. Currency Totaling $7,209.00, ¶ 31, 278 P.3d at 241.

See In re KD, 26 P.3d at 1035–37; In re U.S. Currency Totaling $7,209.00, ¶¶ 1−32, 278
P.3d at 234– 42 (lacking a discussion on the appropriate types and level of leniency).
5

6

See infra notes 157–84 and accompanying text.

7

See infra notes 208–66 and accompanying text.

8

See infra notes 168 –81 and accompanying text.

9

See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text.

10

See infra notes 20–58 and accompanying text.

11

See infra notes 20 –58 and accompanying text.

12

See infra notes 59–124 and accompanying text.

RM v. Dep’t of Family Servs. (In re KMM), 957 P.2d 296, 298 (Wyo. 1998); In re GP, 679
P.2d 976, 984 (Wyo. 1984); Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 630 P.2d 514, 517 (Wyo. 1981)
(holding litigants cannot obtain an advantage by appearing pro se).
13
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the court compels leniency toward pro se litigants regarding minor procedural
errors and the interpretations of their pleadings.14 The differing precedents have
created problems with uniformity throughout the district courts,15 as well as
potential claims for violation of Wyoming’s Open-Courts provision in the state
constitution.16 Part IV discusses how other jurisdictions handle pro se pleadings.17
Part V describes the benefits of a factor analysis in the treatment of pro se pleadings
and outlines the essential elements that must be included in pleadings, regardless
of whether a court chooses to review those pleadings with leniency.18 The analysis
concludes with a suggested list of factors courts should use to determine whether
a pleading merits dismissal.19

II. THE UNIQUE CHALLENGES FACING PRO SE LITIGANTS IN FAMILY LAW
This comment is directed toward Wyoming’s treatment of civil pro se
pleadings and uses family law as a method of viewing the problem. However,
readers should not construe the discussion as solely applying to the family law
context. While a discussion of pro se criminal defendants and their distinct needs
is beyond the scope of this comment, similar arguments also may be relevant to
those individuals. Family law is an appropriate lens through which to view this
problem because a clear majority of family law cases involve at least one pro se
litigant.20 Additionally, litigants in family law encounter a number of unique and
important issues, which courts have an interest in resolving quickly, equitably,
and effectively.21
The first of these issues relates to the fact that young children may be involved
in family law disputes.22 Whether it be divorce proceedings, guardianships, or
Libretti v. State (In re U.S. Currency Totaling $7,209.00), 2012 WY 75, ¶ 31, 278 P.3d 234,
241 (Wyo. 2012); MTM v. State (In re KD), 26 P.3d 1035, 1036 (Wyo. 2001); Apodaca v. Ommen,
807 P.2d 939, 943 (Wyo. 1991) (indicating those appearing pro se are entitled to leniencies).
14

15
See generally Cynthia Gray, Reaching Out or Overreaching: Judicial Ethics and SelfRepresented Litigants, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 97, 101 (2007) (“Uncertainty among
trial judges about how to treat self-represented litigants is understandable given the mixed signals
sent by appellate courts.”).
16

See infra notes 113 –19 and accompanying text.

17

See infra notes 128–56 and accompanying text.

18

See infra notes 157–205 and accompanying text.

19

See infra notes 206–66 and accompanying text.

Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Role
of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2047 (1999) (indicating that
approximately eighty percent of family law cases involve pro se litigants); Jona Goldschmidt, The
Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 42 (2002) (“[T]he great tide of
pro se litigation today appears on the steps of the family courts.”).
20

21

See infra notes 22–58 and accompanying text.

See Pauline H. Tesler, Can This Relationship be Saved? The Legal Profession and Families in
Transition, 55 FAM. CT. REV. 38, 46 (2017) (arguing that legal stakes can hardly be greater in family
22
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child custody orders, issues involving children and their wellbeing are inherently
more important than civil suits for monetary damages.23 The United States
Supreme Court reinforced this concept by declaring the right to have a family
a fundamental right, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.24
Family issues that necessitate litigation may actually harm, or have the potential
to harm, the welfare and development of children.25 Resolving cases quickly
alleviates some of the trauma a child experiences with uncertainties and stress that
come with the litigation process.26
It logically follows that judges should have a greater interest in applying
leniency, disregarding minor procedural errors, and obtaining an equitable result
when children are involved.27 As an extreme example, Rule 10(a) of the Wyoming
Rules of Civil Procedure states, “[e]very pleading must have a caption with the
court’s name, a title, a file number, and a Rule 7(a) designation.”28 Justice Cardine
wrote a dissent in Anderson v. Sno-King Village Association in which he recognized
the rule’s language as mandatory and would have dismissed the pleading for
failure to provide a sufficient caption.29 Justice Cardine scathingly remarked,
“[i]f we are not going to apply the rules as they are written, we might as well abolish
them.”30 Based on Justice Cardine’s remarks, a judge feasibly may dismiss the
pleading of a lawyer or pro se litigant based on an insufficient caption.31 However,
it seems highly inequitable, and potentially harmful, for a judge to dismiss the

law disputes when young children are involved). Dispute resolutions necessitate long-term solutions
that contemplate connections for years to come. Id. If not properly handled, disputes may leave
families even more conflicted than they were prior to the proceeding. Id.
23

See Id. at 46.

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (internal citations omitted)
(providing a non-exhaustive list of fundamental rights: “the rights to marry, to have children, to
direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, [and the right] to marital privacy.”).
24

25
See Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families,
67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 239 (recognizing that shared parenting, especially where issues of continuing
conflict, violence, and young children are involved, can cause lasting harm to children).
26
See Mark Hardin, Court Improvement for Child Abuse and Neglect Litigation: What Next?,
AM. B. ASS’N 2, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/center_on_children_
and_the_law/resourcecenter/ccj_article.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2017) (noting that
reducing judicial delay is key in sparing children from harm associated with spending unnecessarily
cumulative time in foster care, as well as reducing fear, stress, and pain associated with uncertainty
of what will be the judge’s final decision).
27

See supra notes 20–26 and accompanying text.

28

WYO. R. CIV. P. 10(a) (emphasis added).

Anderson v. Sno-King Vill. Ass’n, 745 P.2d 540, 546 (Wyo. 1987) (Cardine, J., dissenting).
Although Justice Cardine interpreted an earlier version of the rule, the applicable statutory language
changed from the word “shall” to the word “must”; thus, his comment is still relevant. See id.
29

30

Id.

31

See id.
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claim of a pro se litigant based solely on failure to provide a sufficient caption.32
This is especially true where there are allegations of abuse and neglect, or when a
child is withheld from a parent for an extended period of time.33 After all, society
recognizes that it is beneficial for children to have a healthy relationship with both
parents.34 To dismiss a pleading based on the insufficiency of the caption rises to
the level of placing form over substance, which could lead to inequities.35
Another issue litigants face is the inability to find an attorney to represent
them.36 In the criminal law context, the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution guarantees indigent defendants the right to an attorney.37 The right
to counsel applies to the states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.38 However, there is no guarantee of a right to an attorney in civil
cases.39 While courts have the discretion to appoint an attorney to a civil litigant,
there is no express requirement to do so, and court-appointed attorneys in civil
cases are rare.40 In the civil law context, some attorneys are willing to represent
indigent clients on a contingent fee basis,41 but contingent fee arrangements
only work when the client seeks monetary damages.42 Most prayers for relief
in family law cases seek equitable relief in the form of injunctions or civil
contempt judgments.43 In fact, it is an ethical violation for an attorney to accept
a contingency fee arrangement in domestic relation matters.44 The absence of
a constitutional guarantee to an attorney, the infrequency of court-appointed

See Hon. Robert Bacharach & Lyn Entzeroth, Judicial Advocacy in Pro Se Litigation:
A Return to Neutrality, 42 IND. L. REV. 19, 20 (2009). Judges should seek to ensure that minor
procedural technicalities do not result in dismissal of pro se pleadings. Id.
32

33

See Tesler, supra note 22, at 46.

Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood: Encouraging Divorced Fathers to Parent,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 1002 (2005).
34

35
Jameson K. George, Ohio Construction Delay Claims: Blaming the Contractor for Plan
Errors?, 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 333, 348 (2011).
36
See Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between the Requirements of Judicial Neutrality and Those
of the Appearance of Neutrality When Parties Appear Pro Se: Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and
Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423, 425 (2004) (“[T]hose who appear in court without
lawyers are, as a general matter, only ‘choosing’ to do so in the most formal sense. Rather, that
‘choice’ is a product of their economic situation and the cost of counsel.”).
37

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

38

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963).

39

Turner v. Roger, 564 U.S. 431, 441– 442 (2011).

Julie M. Bradlow, Comment, Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 659, 662 (1988).
40

41

Id. at 670.

42

See id.

See 2 JUDITH S. CRITTENDEN & CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR., ALABAMA FAMILY LAW
§ 26:1 (2017).
43

44

WYO. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.5(d).
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attorneys in civil cases, and the inability to take advantage of contingent fee
arrangements leaves indigent litigants with the Hobson’s choice of either spending
valuable time searching for attorneys who may be willing to represent them pro
bono or proceeding pro se.45
Family law litigants often confront an additional problem with continuing
jurisdiction.46 Continuing jurisdiction is prevalent in the family law context, as
courts continue to have jurisdiction over issues regarding guardianships,47 child
custody,48 and child support payments.49 Litigants may have to appear in court
for years once a dispute arises.50 Indigent litigants who procure pro bono assistance
are unlikely to obtain assistance for the duration of the dispute, and even those
able to afford attorneys presumably run into financial problems when asked to
pay an attorney for continuous representation and other costs of litigation.51 Due
to the implementation of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement
Act (UCCJEA) in 1997, litigants may find themselves in child custody dispute
litigation in a different jurisdiction than where the decree was originally filed.52
Under the UCCJEA, a court that entered the original decree may lack jurisdiction
over child custody issues if all litigants have moved away from that state.53 In
an increasingly mobile world, litigants who are able to obtain attorneys in one
jurisdiction may have to hire a second attorney, or proceed pro se, if the former
attorney is not licensed in the new jurisdiction.54 In contrast, jurisdiction in most
other areas of the law ends upon entry of a final judgment.55
Based on the unique challenges and important interests at stake, courts
should handle these types of cases with the utmost care.56 Judges should
45

See supra notes 36 – 44 and accompanying text.

See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-5-302, 3-8-205, 20-2-203, 20-4-147 (2018); see generally
Continuing Jurisdiction Law and Legal Definition, U.S. LEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal.com/c/
continuing-jurisdiction/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2018) (“Continuing jurisdiction refers to a court’s
power to retain jurisdiction over a matter even after entering a judgment, allowing the court to
modify its previous rulings or orders.”).
46

47

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3-8-205.

48

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-5-302(a).

49

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-147.

50

See Continuing Jurisdiction Law and Legal Definition, supra note 46.

51
See Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Multiplicity of Child Custody Proceedings—Problems of
California Law, 23 STAN. L. REV. 703, 726 –28 (1971).
52
See Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act Summary, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://
www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Child%20Custody%20Jurisdiction%20and%20
Enforcement%20Act (last visited March 2, 2018) (stating that the UCCJEA was designed to
prevent multiple states from exercising jurisdiction and creating competing child custody orders).
53

Id.

54

See id.

55

See Nixon v. State, 51 P.3d 851, 853 (Wyo. 2002).

56

See supra notes 20 –55 and accompanying text.
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recognize the unique complications litigants face in the family law context and
be both understanding of the decision to proceed pro se as well as mindful of the
consequences at stake.57 Courts should weigh these issues against the gravity of an
error in a pleading to determine if leniency or dismissal is appropriate.58

III. WYOMING’S HANDLING OF PRO SE PLEADINGS
Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8 provides the requirements for
pleadings.59 The rule states that the three aspects of a satisfactory pleading include
a short, plain statement on the court’s jurisdiction, a showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief, and a description of the type of relief sought.60 The rule also
states that no specific form is required and that the “pleadings must be construed
so as to do justice.”61 While this is true, violations of other procedural rules may
lead to dismissal of the pleading, notwithstanding conformity with Rule 8.62

A. Conflicting Precedent
While Wyoming courts recognize that a litigant has the right to selfrepresentation in a civil case,63 Wyoming case law has created two materially
different lines of precedent for handling pro se litigants.64 The first line of cases
proclaims that the court expects pro se litigants to act as a similarly situated
competent attorney.65 The Wyoming Supreme Court has upheld this concept on
several occasions through statements such as, “[a] pro-se litigant will be granted
no greater right than any other litigant and he must expect and receive the same
treatment as if represented by an attorney.”66
The court used this line of cases to dismiss a father’s informal motion to
obtain court-appointed counsel in an action to terminate his parental rights.67 In
57

See supra notes 20–55 and accompanying text.

58

See infra notes 206–66 and accompanying text.

59

WYO. R. CIV. P. 8.

60

Id. 8(a).

61

Id. 8(d)–(e).

62

See supra notes 27–35 and accompanying text.

63

Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 630 P.2d 514, 517 (Wyo. 1981).

Compare Libretti v. State (In re U.S. Currency Totaling $7,209.00), 2012 WY 75, ¶ 31, 278
P.3d 234, 241 (Wyo. 2012), and MTM v. State (In re KD), 26 P.3d 1035, 1036 (Wyo. 2001), with
RM v. Dep’t of Family Servs. (In re KMM), 957 P.2d 296, 298 (Wyo. 1998), and In re GP, 679 P.2d
976, 984 (Wyo. 1984).
64

65

In re KMM, 957 P.2d at 298; In re GP, 679 P.2d at 984; Johnson, 630 P.2d at 517.

In re GP, 679 P.2d at 984 (quoting Suchta v. O.K. Rubber Welders, Inc., 386 P.2d 931, 933
(Wyo. 1963)); accord In re KMM, 957 P.2d at 297–98; Osborn v. Manning, 685 P.2d 1121, 1124
(Wyo. 1984).
66

67

In re KMM, 957 P.2d at 297–98.
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In Interest of KMM, the district court rejected the handwritten letter requesting
a court-appointed attorney, because the request did not comply with the
motion rules required by the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.68 The father
never filed the requisite motion, and the district court ultimately terminated his
parental rights and placed the child in the care of the Department of Family
Services.69 On appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court, the father contended the
district court improperly denied his request for an attorney.70 The Supreme Court
upheld the district court’s decision, explaining “[o]ne has the right to appear pro
se; but when a person chooses to do so, he must be held to the same standards as
if he were represented by counsel.”71
The Wyoming Supreme Court justifies these rulings on the ground that any
deferential treatment to a pro se litigant would condone the practice of representing
oneself in order to gain leniency on procedural rules.72 The Wyoming Supreme
Court also expressed concern that litigants would attempt to place themselves
at an advantage by representing themselves, expecting assistance from the court,
other attorneys, or the other party.73
The Wyoming Supreme Court’s second line of cases acknowledges “the
litigant acting pro se is entitled to ‘a certain leniency’ from the more stringent
standards accorded formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”74 Many of these cases
generally acknowledge that pro se litigants must reasonably adhere to both court
rules and procedural requirements.75 Nowhere in this line of cases does the court
establish how to determine how much leniency pro se litigants are entitled, nor
do they describe which practices do and do not reasonably adhere to court and
procedural rules.76
68

Id.

69

Id.

70

Id. at 297.

Id. at 298 (quoting Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 630 P.2d 514, 517 (Wyo. 1981))
(granting no leniency to a father who wrote a letter to the court seeking counsel when that father
filed appropriate motions at other stages throughout the proceeding).
71

72

Id.

73

Johnson, 630 P.2d at 571.

Osborn v. Emporium Videos, 848 P.2d 237, 240 (Wyo. 1993); accord Libretti v. State (In re
U.S. Currency Totaling $7,209.00), 2012 WY 75, ¶ 31, 278 P.3d 234, 241 (Wyo. 2012); Young v.
State, 46 P.3d 295, 298 (Wyo. 2002); MTM v. State (In re KD), 26 P.3d 1035, 1036 (Wyo. 2001);
Apodaca v. Ommen, 807 P.2d 939, 943 (Wyo. 1991).
74

75
Osborn, 848 P.2d at 240; In re U.S. Currency Totaling $7,209.00, ¶ 31, 278 P.3d at 241;
Young, 46 P.3d at 297.
76
See In re U.S. Currency Totaling $7,209.00, ¶¶ 1−32, 278 P.3d at 234–42; In re KD, 26
P.3d at 1035–37; see also Rory K. Schneider, Comment, Illiberal Construction of Pro Se Pleadings,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 585, 600 (2011) (“[D]espite consistently affirming [the liberal construction
of pro se pleadings] the court has failed to flesh out precisely how relaxed a standard lower courts
should apply.”).
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The problems are apparent in Robinson v. Hamblin.77 In Robinson, the
Wyoming Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiff, appearing pro se at the
trial court level, had standing to challenge an insurance company’s appointment
of counsel to the defendant in a personal injury action.78 The court ruled against
the plaintiff on the issue based on his lack of interest in the defendant’s right
to obtain counsel and because issue was not raised in the trial court.79 On the
second justification, the court recognized the plaintiff was entitled leniency based
on his pro se status, but “the trial court accorded [the plaintiff ] every courtesy
and consideration to which he was entitled.”80 The rest of the opinion lacks any
discussion as to what courtesies and considerations the trial court applied.81

B. Problems with Precedent
The problems with the discrepancy in the Wyoming Supreme Court’s rulings
are threefold. First, the two lines of cases create confusion at the lower court
level.82 Second, there is a lack of guidance as to what constitutes liberal treatment
to pro se litigants.83 Third, district court judges’ discretion is too broad, diluting
legal principles of consistency and predictability.84
The Wyoming Supreme Court has not overruled either line of cases, making
it difficult to predict how it may rule in the future.85 This creates confusion in
the lower courts.86 District courts across the state can cite either line of precedent
to accept or reject a pro se pleading if there is a procedural deficiency.87 Decisions
to grant leniency simply may come down to tolerance of the court regarding
the claim, litigant, or nearly any other conceivable factor.88 District court judges

77

See Robinson v. Hamblin, 914 P.2d 152, 154 (Wyo. 1996).

78

Id.

79

Id.

80

Id.

81

See id. at 152–56.

82

See Gray, supra note 15, at 101.

83

See Schneider, supra note 76, at 600.

See Engler, supra note 20, at 2015–16 (recognizing that some judges go so far as to silence
unrepresented litigants to ensure their claims are not heard).
84

85
Compare Libretti v. State (In re U.S. Currency Totaling $7,209.00), 2012 WY 75, 278 P.3d
234 (Wyo. 2012), and MTM v. State (In re KD), 26 P.3d 1035 (Wyo. 2001), with RM v. Dep’t of
Family Servs. (In re KMM), 957 P.2d 296 (Wyo. 1998), and In re GP, 679 P.2d 976 (Wyo. 1984).
86

Gray, supra note 15, at 101.

See Karin Elizabeth Lossi Anderson, Attorneys Beware: Unprecedented Law Changing in
Nebraska. Summary Judgment, Affirmative Defenses and City State Bank v. Holstine, 260 Neb. 578,
618 N.W.2d 704 (2000), 81 NEB. L. REV. 424, 431 (2002).
87

88

See Engler, supra note 20, at 2015.
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are torn between remaining impartial and hearing cases on their merits.89 On
the one hand, “extending too much procedural leniency to a pro se litigant risks
undermining the impartial role of the judge in the adversary system.”90 On the
other, it is a disfavored practice to dismiss a case without adjudicating its merits.91
A more structured approach would alleviate confusion for district court judges
and allow them comfort in ensuring they are making correct decisions.92
The absence of further discussion on what constitutes proper lenient treatment
of pro se litigants adds to the ambiguity.93 Judges often worry about what they
are allowed to do and what they should do when faced with an unrepresented
litigant.94 Ninety-one percent of judges nationwide report that they have no
general policy on how to handle pro se litigants in the courtroom.95 While the
second line of cases recognizes that some level of leniency should be afforded,
there is no description as to what constitutes an appropriate level of leniency for
the situation.96 The Wyoming Supreme Court has commented that a trial court
has awarded a pro se litigant leniency, but has never explained what that courtesy
included.97 A Wyoming Supreme Court opinion discussing potential factors and
allowances would be beneficial in clarifying this confusion.98
The lack of Wyoming Supreme Court guidance has left trial court discretion
too broad.99 Based on the conflicting and vague precedent, courts might treat
litigants differently based on the time and place they file their pleadings.100 A
See Bacharach & Entzeroth, supra note 32, at 20 (“The first objective involves the measures
used to assess whether the pleading sufficiently states a claim for relief. Part of this objective seeks to
assure that mere procedural technicalities do not trip up the unwary litigant. The second, somewhat
incongruous goal, deals with the basic notion that both the represented and unrepresented must
follow the same procedural rules.”); Goldschmidt, supra note 20, at 37; Donna M. Jones, Book
Review, WIS. LAW., July 2003, at 38 (reviewing PATRICIA A. GARCIA, LITIGANTS WITHOUT LAWYERS:
COURTS AND LAWYERS MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF SELF-REPRESENTATION (2002)).
89

90

Bradlow, supra note 40, at 671.

Id. at 680 (“[T]he pro se civil litigant’s constitutionally protected interest is in a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.”).
91

92

See infra notes 169 – 87 and accompanying text.

Bradlow, supra note 40, at 659– 60 (“[C]urrently, procedural treatment of pro se civil
litigants is at best highly case specific, at worst inconsistent.”); Schneider, supra note 76, at 600.
93

94

Engler, supra note 20, at 1987–88.

95

Id. at 2013.

See, e.g, Libretti v. State (In re U.S. Currency Totaling $7,209.00), 2012 WY 75, 278 P.3d
234 (Wyo. 2012); MTM v. State (In re KD), 26 P.3d 1035 (Wyo. 2001).
96

97
See, e.g., In re KD, 26 P.3d at 1035–37; In re U.S. Currency Totaling $7,209.00, ¶¶ 1−32,
278 P.3d at 234– 42; Schneider, supra note 76, at 600.
98

See infra notes 169–87 and accompanying text.

99

See infra notes 100–12 and accompanying text.

Schneider, supra note 76, at 600 (“[D]istrict courts apply different degrees of relaxation,
thereby rendering pleading leniency less reliable at preventing dismissal of pro se complaints.”).
100
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judge in one district may provide more allowances or consider different factors
than a judge in another district.101 This creates a system in which pro se litigants
may or may not have their cases heard on the merits based simply on the district of
filing rather than on an analysis of objective factors.102 Procedural issues can arise
early in the judicial process.103 Judges may ultimately want to exercise discretion
to obtain the most just results, but they must make decisions regarding dismissal
before they are fully informed on the facts of the case.104 The judge who mandates
strict compliance with procedural rules may dismiss a pro se pleading, ultimately
leading to an inequitable result.105
Not only are cases considered differently based on where they are filed, but
also when they are filed.106 Many judges are driven by docket control, which could
create disparate treatment within the same court.107 A judge may be more willing
to accept a pro se pleading with errors at a time when there are vacancies in the
docket, whereas a busy docket leaves “little incentive to expend precious judicial
resources on educating and protecting unrepresented litigants.”108
While it is plausible that the Wyoming Supreme Court intended to leave
broad discretion to trial court judges, the overall lack of clarity has led to sweeping
discretion and the potential for application in profoundly different ways.109 Pro se
litigants may mistake dismissal for defeat, not realizing they can refile or appeal.110
This result could be particularly damaging in the family law context where, for
example, parents may be separated from their children. By obeying procedural
rules and exercising discretion to dismiss, judges may unintentionally perpetuate
inequitable results to the most vulnerable in our society.111 The implementation
101
Id.; Engler, supra note 20, at 2014 (“An examination of the decisions, however, suggests that the outcomes may be driven as much by the particular facts of the case as by a given
judge’s approach.”).
102

See Engler, supra note 20, at 2014; Schneider, supra note 76, at 600.

103

JIMMY VAUGHT, BEING PREPARED TO SUCCESSFULLY MEDIATE OR LITIGATE FAMILY LAW 6 (2012).

Bourke v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., LP, 2013 WY 93, ¶¶ 40–41, 305 P.3d 1164, 1173
(Wyo. 2013) (holding issues of venue and jurisdiction must be decided before analyzing the merits
of the case); see also Wyrough & Loser, Inc. v. Pelmor Laboratories, Inc., 376 F.2d 543, 547 (3rd Cir.
1967) (“[T]here also exists a strong policy to conserve judicial time and effort; preliminary matters
such as defective service, personal jurisdiction and venue should be raised and disposed of before the
court considers the merits or quasimerits of a controversy.”).
104

105

See Bourke, ¶¶ 40–41, 305 P.3d at 1173; Wyrough, 376 F.2d at 547.

106

See Engler, supra note 20, at 1988–89.

107

Id.

108

Id. at 1989.

109

See supra notes 82–108 and accompanying text.

See Wilson v. Dooley, 2017 U.S. Dist. WL 4772579, at *6 (D. S.D. Sep. 13, 2017). It
is presumed that pro se litigants understand the law. Id. Allegations of legal incompetence do not
justify special treatment. Id.
110

111

See supra notes 99–105 and accompanying text.
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of factors would lead to more consistent results, clear up the ambiguity regarding
the relevant legal framework, and still allow judicial discretion in applying
that framework.112

C. The Open-Courts Provision
The combination of extensive trial court discretion, confusion as to which
line of cases to follow, and lack of clarity as to the level of leniency that should
be afforded pro se litigants could lead to a challenge under the Wyoming OpenCourts provision in the Wyoming Constitution.113 The provision states, “[a]ll
courts shall be open and every person for an injury done to person, reputation
or property shall have justice administered without sale, denial or delay.”114 The
provision further provides, “[s]uits may be brought against the state in such
manner and in such courts as the legislature may by law direct.”115 The Wyoming
Supreme Court has established that, for there to be an Open-Courts violation, the
litigant must establish that “he has a well-recognized common-law cause of action
that is being restricted; and . . . the restriction is unreasonable or arbitrary when
balanced against the purpose and basis of the statute.”116
Common family law conflicts present situations that may generate suit under
the Open-Courts provision if a pleading is rejected. For example, a pro se litigant
may have a well-recognized cause of action if a former, or soon-to-be former,
spouse withholds visitation of a minor child.117 If a court dismissed the litigant’s
pleading, the litigant could argue that the extent of the confusion regarding the
applicable law and the level of discretion entrusted to trial court judges has reached
the point of arbitrariness.118 This arbitrariness in administering procedural rules
may be deemed to have unreasonably restricted access to the courts.119

D. Conclusion Regarding Pro Se Litigants in Wyoming
Based on precedent, it is unclear whether pro se litigants are required to act
as attorneys or whether they are afforded additional leniency based on their pro se
status.120 Wyoming district courts have struggled to determine which line of cases

112

See infra notes 169–87 and accompanying text.

113

See WYO. CONST. art. I, § 8.

114

Id.

115

Id.

Kordus v. Montes, 2014 WY 146, ¶ 11, 337 P.3d 1138, 1141 (Wyo. 2014) (quoting
Robinson v. Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 1137 (Wyo. 2000)).
116

117

See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-202 (2018).

118

See supra notes 82–108 and accompanying text.

119

See Kordus, ¶ 11, 337 P.3d at 1141.

120

See supra notes 63–112 and accompanying text.
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to follow when interpreting pro se pleadings.121 Even if a court follows the second
line of cases, it is unclear what criteria it should consider when determining the
appropriate level and type of leniency.122 While judicial discretion is advantageous
in many situations, too much ambiguity leads to disparate treatment of pro se
litigants.123 A more structured factor analysis would be advantageous in ensuring
that pro se litigants are treated equally, reducing potentially inequitable dismissals,
and allowing important cases to be heard on their merits.124

IV. OTHER JURISDICTIONS ON PRO SE PLEADINGS
When confusion arises in one jurisdiction, it is often beneficial to look
toward other jurisdictions for guidance.125 Thus, a review of other jurisdictions is
warranted regarding whether leniency is afforded to pro se litigants, the amount
of leniency afforded, and the different types of leniency applied.126 Second, it is
crucial to understand the reasons courts give for dismissing pro se pleadings as
insufficient when leniency is not afforded.127

A. Leniency Granted to Pro Se Litigants
To begin, in the case Haines v. Kerner, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that, in cases involving the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pro se
litigants are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.”128 In the same opinion, the Supreme Court recognized that it should not
matter whether allegations are artfully pleaded.129
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognizes that pro se litigants
should be given leniency in their pleadings.130 In Flynn v. People’s Choice Home
Loans, Inc., the Sixth Circuit affirmed a default judgment in favor of Flynn for
mortgage and foreclosure improprieties but awarded him no damages.131 The court

121

See supra notes 63–112 and accompanying text.

122

See supra notes 93 –98 and accompanying text.

123

See supra notes 99 –112 and accompanying text.

124

See infra notes 169– 87 and accompanying text.

E.g., Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66, 76–77 (Kan. 2014); Foster v.
Roman Catholic Diocese of Vt., 70 A.2d 230, 232 (Vt. 1950); In re Marriage of Swing, 194 P.3d
498, 501 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
125

126

See infra notes 128–41 and accompanying text.

127

See infra notes 142–51 and accompanying text.

128

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

129

Id.

Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976 (6th Cir. 2012); see Flynn v. People’s
Choice Home Loans, Inc., 440 F. App’x 452, 457 (6th Cir. 2011).
130

131

Flynn, 440 F. App’x at 453.
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held that the district court was sufficiently lenient with Flynn’s claim because it
attempted to decipher a claim from a pleading that was nearly incomprehensible
and provided Flynn two opportunities to prove damages.132 The district court was
not required to schedule a damage hearing on Flynn’s behalf to pursue the issue.133
Similarly, the Alaska Supreme Court also affords more leeway to pleadings
drafted by pro se litigants.134 The court clarified this rule in Breck v. Ulmer, in
which it disapproved of the district court’s failure to inform Breck, proceeding pro
se, that her response to summary judgment should include affidavits.135 The Alaska
Supreme Court held trial courts should provide pro se litigants with information
of the proper procedure necessary to accomplish their goals.136 In another case,
the Alaska Supreme Court held the pro se pleading must be clear enough for both
the court and the litigant’s opponents to discern the legal arguments the pro se
party brings forth.137
The Supreme Court of Nebraska went one step further with its leniency
toward pro se litigants in Nebraska ex. rel. B.M. v. Brian F.138 The court affirmed
its practice of allowing judges to suggest amendments to pro se litigants that would
make their pleadings sufficient.139 However, the court held that the trial court
went too far in interpreting a pleading titled “modification of child support”
as a request for termination of parental rights and then suggesting that the
litigant amend with specific allegations.140 The court clarified that the practice of
suggesting amendments should be used sparingly.141

B. Dismissal of Pro Se Pleadings
Dismissal of pro se cases are common in the judicial system.142 Approximately
seventy percent of pro se cases are dismissed either sua sponte or by motion from the
132

Id. at 457.

133

Id.

134

Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987).

135

Id.

Id. The Alaska Supreme Court ultimately ruled that while the trial court should have
provided the pro se litigant information on the appropriate procedural steps in responding
to summary judgment, the error was harmless, and the ruling of the trial court would not be
reversed. Id.
136

137

Casciola v. F.S. Air Serv., Inc., 120 P.3d 1059, 1063 (Alaska 2005).

138

See Nebraska ex rel. B.M v. Brian F., 846 N.W.2d 257, 267 (Neb. 2014).

139

Id.

140

Id. at 267– 68.

141

Id. at 267.

See Jonathan D. Rosenbloom, Exploring Methods to Improve Management and Fairness in
Pro Se Cases: A Study of the Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New York, 30 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 305, 311, 335–37 (2002). Rosenbloom relied on a study of 765 non-bankruptcy, non-habeas
corpus pro se cases in the district court for the Southern District of New York. Id. at 311, 318.
142
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opposing party.143 Dismissing cases can be problematic when courts fail to justify
their reasons for dismissal.144 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit chastised
a district court for its failure to provide a thorough analysis of the record when
it dismissed a pro se plaintiff ’s claim.145 The court concluded that the absence of
a thorough analysis prevented the appellate court from conducting a meaningful
review and was an abuse of discretion.146
Sua sponte dismissal is common and particularly troublesome for pro se
litigants.147 Pro se litigants who have their pleadings dismissed sua sponte are less
likely to have an explanation on the record as to what defects exist, whereas dismissal by opposing party motion contain assertions in the motion and a court’s
ruling on the motion.148 In Tingler v. Marshall, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit recognized that judicial dismissal sua sponte should be sparingly
granted.149 The court identified several problems with sua sponte dismissal,
including impairing the court’s role as an independent observer, the absence
of an opportunity to amend the pleading, and creating an incomplete record
for appeal.150 Courts have an interest in hearing cases on their merits and could
eliminate some of the problems associated with sua sponte dismissals by waiting
for a party to bring the motion.151

C. Conclusion on Other Jurisdictions’ Treatment of Pro Se Pleadings
Using the analyses above, several key concepts as to how other jurisdictions
handle pro se pleadings become apparent. Courts generally give some leeway to pro
se litigants in the pleading process.152 Courts should do their best to decipher legal

Id. at 335 –37 (noting that of the 765 pro se cases reviewed, 55.6% of cases were dismissed
sua sponte and 14.4% were dismissed via motion to dismiss or summary judgement).
143

144

See Reichart v. Wetzel, 673 F.App’x 133, 135 (3d Cir. 2001).

145

Id.

146

Id.

147

See Rosenbloom, supra note 142, at 335–37.

See Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109, 1111 (6th Cir. 1983), superseded by statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (2012), as recognized in Baker v. Ohio Cent. Sch. Sys. Region III, No.
97-3020, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13621 at *4 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Franklin v. Or. State
Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981)) (“Such facts are not in the record since the
defendant was never served with the complaint and did not have the opportunity to file an answer
or any other pleadings.”).
148

Id. (“Such sua sponte dismissals are not in accordance with our traditional adversarial
system of justice because they cast the district court in the role of ‘a proponent rather than an
independent entity.’”).
149

Id. at 1111–12; Osborn v. Emporium Videos, 848 P.2d 237, 241– 42 (Wyo. 1993)
(adopting the language in Tingler regarding the problems with sua sponte dismissal).
150

151

Tingler, 716 F.2d at 1111.

152

See supra notes 128 –41 and accompanying text.
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claims from inartful pleadings.153 Some leniency may be provided for informing
pro se litigants of any deficiencies in their pleadings.154 When trial courts do
dismiss an action, they should provide a full, thorough analysis of their reasoning
to assist pro se litigants in understanding why their pleading was defective and
to aid appellate courts in their review process.155 Trial courts should be wary of
dismissing claims sua sponte.156

V. A FACTOR APPROACH ANALYZING THE SUFFICIENCY OF PRO SE PLEADINGS
Currently, Wyoming courts do not consider specific factors when
analyzing whether a pro se pleading is sufficient.157 Precedent simply grants broad
discretion to trial courts when determining whether a pro se litigant is expected
to act as a competent attorney or whether the court should grant leniency.158
There is no guidance as to what constitutes an appropriate amount of leniency or
factors a judge should consider when making this determination.159 Cases along
this line simply say that judges should make some leniency and allowances for pro
se litigants.160
Moving forward, Wyoming should follow the line of cases allowing additional
leniencies for pro se litigants and, in doing so, courts should analyze factors based
on a sliding scale.161 A case by the Wyoming Supreme Court should clearly
announce the abandonment of the strict compliance with procedural rules line
of cases, affirmatively adopt the leniency standard, and provide for the analysis
of factors in determining the proper amount of leniency.162 Pro se litigants need
leniency because they are inherently disadvantaged by their limited understanding
of the law.163 Unrepresented litigants unintentionally “forfeit important rights” at
each stage of the process, including the pleading stage, based on their lack of
legal counsel.164 The purpose of affording leniency to pro se litigants is to ensure

153

See supra notes 128–41 and accompanying text.

154

See supra notes 134–41 and accompanying text.

155

See supra notes 142–50 and accompanying text.

156

See supra notes 147–51 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Libretti v. State (In re U.S. Currency Totaling $7,209.00), 2012 WY 75, ¶ 31, 278
P.3d 234, 241 (Wyo. 2012); MTM v. State (In re KD), 26 P.3d 1035, 1036 (Wyo. 2001); Robinson
v. Hamblin, 914 P.2d 152, 154 (Wyo. 1996).
157

158

See supra notes 63 –81 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., In re U.S. Currency Totaling $7,209.00, ¶¶ 1–32, 278 P.3d at 234–42; In re KD,
26 P.3d at 1035–37; Robinson, 914 P.2d at 152–56.
159

160

See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text.

161

See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.

162

See infra notes 206–66 and accompanying text.

163

See Engler, supra note 20, at 1988.

164

Id. at 1989.
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valid claims are heard, rather than dismissed due to procedural deficiencies
unbeknownst to the petitioner.165 Procedural formalities “should [not] allow those
rules to operate as hidden, lethal traps for those unversed in law.”166 Although
providing leniency may require additional time and effort, the alternative may
foreclose access to the courts to some of the litigants who are in the greatest
need of relief.167 Treating unrepresented litigants’ pleadings liberally can alleviate
some of the strain in a system that is biased toward those well-versed in the law.168

A. Benefits of a Factor Analysis
A factor analysis for handling pro se pleadings would resolve some of the
confusion current precedent creates and lead to more consistency for both judges
and litigants.169 Factors would give judges direction on how much leniency to
grant pro se litigant pleadings.170 They also would allow judges to reach more
consistent results in their own courts and amongst courts throughout Wyoming.171
Additionally, the factor approach would result in a more objective analysis of
pro se pleadings.172 Under current precedent, the same judge may differ in handling
pro se pleadings based on docket, fluctuation in approach to case resolution, as
well as the amount of time that has gone by since the judge last handled the issue.173
The factor approach would simply remind judges of a list of things to consider
when interpreting pro se pleadings.174 Judges would be less open to criticism
Jonah Wexler, Fair Presentation and Exhaustion: The Search for Identical Standards, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 581, 593 (2009).
165

Gray, supra note 15, at 106 (quoting White v. Lewis, 804 P.2d 805, 815–16 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1990) (Lankford, J., dissenting)).
166

167

Id. at 106.

168

Bradlow, supra note 40, at 683.

See Bacharach & Entzeroth, supra note 32, at 31 (“Without objective standards to provide
guidance, courts have chosen to decide for themselves which pro se cases are plausible and which
are not.”).
169

Robin J. Effron, Reason Giving and Rule Making in Procedural Law, 65 ALA. L. REV. 683,
687 (2014) (“By combining an explicit grant of discretion with factors that a judge must consider
and a requirement that a judge must state specific reasons for her decision, such a rule would begin
to capture the balance of flexibility and uniformity that has thus far been elusive.”).
170

171
See Bacharach & Entzeroth, supra note 32, at 30–31 (“[W]ith the deterioration in objective
standards . . . judges likely gauge plausibility differently based on their ideologies, attitudes,
and experiences.”).
172
Rhonda E. Stringer, The Due Process Defense in “Reverse Sting” Cases: When do Police
Overstep the Bounds of Permissible Conduct? Kelly v. State, 593 So.2d 1060 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), 22
STETSON L. REV. 1305, 1335 (1993) (“Determining significant factors in a case and then attempting
an objective inquiry into those factors will prove much more useful in formulating an objective test/
analysis than simply basing decisions on personal standards and individual philosophies.”).
173

See Bacharach & Entzeroth, supra note 32, at 30–31; Engler, supra note 20, at 1988–89.

Chris Guthrie, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 41
(2007) (“Multifactor tests can help ensure that judges consider all relevant factors and can remind
them of their responsibility to base decisions on more than mere intuition.”).
174
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from litigants for arbitrary dismissal because a factor analysis would ensure that
judges throughout Wyoming treat pro se pleadings similarly.175 Furthermore,
the likelihood of success of an Open-Courts challenge for arbitrariness would
greatly diminish.176
The factor approach would also benefit litigants by giving them more
direction as to the flaws in their pleadings.177 The current level of subjectivity
leaves litigants unsure of whether their pleadings will be sufficient and allows
for rejection of their pleadings based on opaque reasons.178 If judges could
point to deficient factors, litigants would have a better understanding of exactly
why their pleadings are deficient and how they may be able to correct them in
the future.179
The third benefit of a factor approach is that it gives judges something to
fall back on when making decisions.180 Sometimes, appellate courts criticize
judges for scant analyses and for failing to articulate reasons for dismissal.181 This
problem may arise when judges are unsure on “what they can and cannot do—or
what they should and should not do—in handling cases involving unrepresented
litigants”.182 With a factor approach, judges can clearly explain to litigants and
appellate courts their reasons for dismissal without worrying dismissal is based on
an inappropriate rational.183 Utilizing the factor approach would create a complete
record for appellate courts when reviewing the decision of the trial court.184
Finally, the factor approach would not unduly restrict trial court judges’
discretion.185 Judges would have the factors for guidance but would still determine

175

See Effron, supra note 170, at 687.

See id.; Kordus v. Montes, 2014 WY 146, ¶ 11, 337 P.3d 1138, 1141 (Wyo. 2014) (quoting
Robinson v. Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 1137 (Wyo. 2000)).
176

177
See Gray, supra note 15, at 121 (quoting Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir. 1996))
(“‘[N]otions of simple fairness’ suggest that a judge should give an explanation for a ruling to a
self-represented litigant, if not to every litigant.”).
178

See id.

179

Id.

C. Antionette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent Offending and Punitive
Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 659, 716 (2005).
180

181
See Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 276 (3d Cir. 2001); Reichart
v. Wetzel, 673 F.App’x 133, 135 (3d Cir. 2001).
182

Engler, supra note 20, at 1987–88.

Maren J. Messing, The Protective Sweep Doctrine: Reaffirming a Limited Exception, 44
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 33, 66 (2010).
183

184

Id.

185

See Effron, supra note 170, at 687.
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the overall weight of the factors as applied to the circumstances.186 Interpreting
pleadings as sufficient or insufficient would still be discretionary and judges could
take comfort in knowing that there is still deference to their decisions.187

B. Beyond the Factors: Necessities in Pleadings
While this comment advocates for a factor approach, there are some
requirements of a pleading that cannot be excused, even for the pro se litigant.188
In the absence of certain requirements, judges should not even reach the factor
stage of the analysis.189 These necessities are due process rights, including subject
matter jurisdiction and service of process.190 Additionally, excessively abusive or
vulgar language justifies a court rejecting further inquiry.191
The absence of subject matter jurisdiction is a dispositive ground for
rejecting a litigant’s pleading.192 Case law on the topic confirms that courts
have an affirmative duty to bring forth subject matter jurisdictional issues sua
sponte to determine whether the court is able to resolve the dispute.193 Courts
need not waste precious judicial resources by prolonging a case over which the
court ultimately has no jurisdiction to preside.194 Subject matter jurisdiction is a
fundamental due process right that a litigant cannot waive or overcome based on
any compilation of factors.195
Service of process is another requirement that cannot be overcome via
factors.196 Parties have a fundamental due process right to service based on the
necessity of notice.197 The right to notice of a controversy is compulsory for a
186

See Messing, supra note 183, at 716.

187

See Effron, supra note 170, at 687.

188

See infra notes 190–205 and accompanying text.

189

See infra notes 190–205 and accompanying text.

Bradlow, supra note 40, at 676 (“[M]inimum due process protections include the
requirement of adequate notice, the right to a neutral and detached decision maker, the right to hire
counsel, the right to present evidence and confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the right not
to be subjected to the jurisdiction or laws of a forum with which one has no significant contacts.”).
190

191

Gose v. City of Douglas, 2009 WY 131, ¶¶ 4−6, 218 P.3d 945, 947 (Wyo. 2009).

192

See Guy v. Lampert, 2015 WY 148, ¶¶ 26–27, 362 P.3d 331, 340 (Wyo. 2015).

193

Edsall v. Moore, 2016 WY 71, ¶ 10, 375 P.3d 799, 801– 02 (Wyo. 2016).

Thomas E. Baker, Proposed Intramural Reforms: What the U.S. Courts of Appeals Might do to
Help Themselves, 25 SAINT MARY’S L.J. 1321, 1332–33 (1994).
194

Cotton v. Brow, 903 P.2d 530, 531 (Wyo. 1995) (“Unlike personal jurisdiction, subject
matter jurisdiction cannot be waived.”).
195

Walden’s Lessee v. Craig’s Heirs, 39 U.S. 147, 154 (1840) (“[S]ervice of process, or notice,
is necessary to enable a Court to exercise jurisdiction in a case; and if jurisdiction be taken where
there has been no service of process, or notice, the proceeding is a nullity.”); see also Bradlow, supra
note 40, at 676.
196

197

Reynolds v. Moore, 2014 WY 20, ¶ 11, 318 P.3d 362, 365–66 (Wyo. 2014).
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fair system.198 However, judges and court staff should be entitled to direct pro
se litigants to the applicable service of process requirements.199 The duty of
“[i]mpartiality does not require passivity.”200 Informing litigants where their
pleadings are deficient is fundamentally different from aiding a litigant in
correcting those errors and does not run the risk of hindering impartiality.201
The final reason a court may not reach the factor analysis is because of
excessively abusive and vulgar language in the pleading.202 The Wyoming
Supreme Court has held that filings designed to attack the integrity of the court
or an opponent through repeated and excessive abusive and vulgar language will
not be tolerated.203 While minimal disrespect toward the court or a party should
not necessarily be grounds for dismissal, pro se litigants with heightened personal
emotions regarding their claims may cross the line between tolerated behavior and
unacceptable conduct.204 Courts are not, and should not be, required to entertain
such filings.205
Once a court has established an ability to move forward because the pleading
satisfies due process and is not excessively crass, it should consult a list of factors
to determine the sufficiency of remaining pro se pleadings.

C. Suggested List of Factors
Based on the current lack of clarity regarding interpreting pro se pleadings,
a factor approach would be beneficial.206 The following is a list of seven factors
courts should use to determine if a pleading is sufficient to warrant scheduling
a hearing: the court’s ability to determine a cause of action, the type of relief
sought, whether fundamental rights are at stake, the likelihood of success, the
appropriateness of the relief sought, the number of pleadings filed by the litigant,
and the likelihood the party will suffer prejudice if the court does not act on
the pleading.207

198

Id.

199

Goldschmidt, supra note 20, at 47.

200

Gray, supra note 15, at 105.

201

See id. at 105–07.

202

Gose v. City of Douglas, 2009 WY 131, ¶¶ 4–6, 218 P.3d 945, 947 (Wyo. 2009).

203

Id.

See id. ¶¶ 2–5, 218 P.3d at 946–47; see also, e.g., Phillips v. Carey, 638 F.2d 207, 208–09
(10th Cir. 1981); Theriault v. Silber, 579 F.2d 302, 303 (5th Cir. 1978); Koehl v. Bernstein, 740
F.3d 860, 861–63 (2d Cir. 2014).
204

205

See Gose, ¶¶ 4– 6, 218 P.3d at 947.

206

See supra notes 169–87 and accompanying text.

207

See infra notes 208–66 and accompanying text.
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1. Court’s Ability to Determine a Cause of Action
The court’s ability to move forward with a claim is dependent upon a valid
cause of action.208 Precedent recognizes the importance of a court’s ability to
ascertain a claim for relief from the pleadings.209 It should not matter how artful
litigants are in their pleadings, so long as the courts and their opponents are
able to decipher a legal claim.210 Judges should interpret pleadings in a way that
permits the court to proceed to the factual and legal issues.211 No key words or
requirements must be present.212
Most pro se litigants are untrained in legal requests and pleadings, which
judges should consider in affording leniency to these litigants.213 The failure to
mention or title a claim by name should not be detrimental, so long as facts are
alleged to indicate that the litigant has been injured and a viable claim exists.214
However, judges should not be forced to create a claim where none exists, nor
should they read in facts or allegations that are absent in the pleading.215 Judges do
not have the discretion to overlook insufficient factual bases in the pleading due
to the necessity of notifying the opponent of the factual allegations against him.216
Judges should be wary of filings that do no more than criticize decisions
the court has already made.217 Pro se litigants may be dissatisfied with the outcome
of their litigation and address their complaints to the court in an attempt to change
the court’s mind.218 Without new factual allegations warranting modification of
an order, the complaint contains no cause of action.219 The appropriate avenue
for disputing the court’s decision is to file an appeal, not to continue filing within
the court after it has entered a final judgment.220 The doctrine of res judicata

208

See WYO. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

209

See Flynn v. People’s Choice Home Loans, Inc., 440 F.App’x 452, 457 (6th Cir. 2011).

210

61 AM. JUR. 2D Pleading § 156 (2d ed. 2018).

211

Gray, supra note 15, at 124–25.

212

See id.

Marcy G. Glenn, Pro se Civil Appeals—Resources and Opportunities, 45 COLO. LAW. 57,
60 (2016).
213

214

Gray, supra note 15, at 124–25.

215

15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 156 (2d ed. 2018); Gray, supra note 15, at 125.

216

61 AM. JUR. 2D Pleading § 156; Gray, supra note 15, at 125.

217

See Jones v. Gemalto, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. WL 3948108, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 29, 2015).

218

See id.

219

See WYO. R. CIV. P. 8.

220

See WYO. R. APP. P. 1.04.
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bars a complaint of this nature, and the court would be justified in dismissing the
complaint sua sponte.221

2. Type of Relief Sought
A judge should also consider the type of relief sought in determining whether
he or she should accept a pleading as sufficient.222 The leniency afforded to pro
se litigants should extend further when important social policies and societal
safety are at play.223 Furthermore, the type of relief sought may help explain
the petitioner’s inability to obtain counsel through other arrangements such as
contingency fees.224
Although monetary relief may make an instrumental difference in litigants’
lives, there is often little harm in delaying the proceeding if the pleading is
insufficient.225 On the other hand, cases involving equitable relief often are more
beneficial to societal values in general.226 Injunctions, restraining orders, and
child safety disputes often affect more than just the parties involved.227 Injuries
to others in society, or society as a whole, may occur when a court fails to hear a
case requesting equitable relief on its merits.228 For example, a suit in which one

221

Spriggs v. Pioneer Carissa Gold Mines, Inc., 378 P.2d 238, 239–40 (Wyo. 1963).

Livingston v. Guice, 1995 WL 610355, at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 18, 1995) (criticizing a district
court judge for not considering the effects of plaintiff ’s request for a specific type of relief ).
222

223

See supra notes 20–58 and accompanying text.

224

See supra notes 36–45 and accompanying text.

See Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 6850969, at *1–2,
(S.D. N.Y. Dec. 4, 2014) (“Delay alone is insufficient to justify denial of a motion to amend
the pleadings. For delay to bar amendment, a considerable time must have passed, without valid
reason, between the filing of the pleading and the motion to amend.”); Robert A. Matthews, Jr.,
Amendments Sought After Scheduling Order Deadline, 6 ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 39.46 (2018)
(“Modification of deadlines may be granted for good cause. One factor in determining whether this
delay is sought for good cause is the prejudice it would cause the opposing party.”); Johnson v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 608 P.2d 1299, 1303 (Wyo. 1980) (“[L]eave (to amend) shall
be freely given when justice so requires.”).
225

226
See Merrill v. Bishop, 237 P.2d 186, 191 (Wyo. 1951) (“[E]quity delights to do complete
justice, and that it constantly aims to settle the rights of all persons interested in the subject-matter,
not in piecemeal, but in a single suit.”).

See Cathy Wang, Gang Injunctions Under Heat From Equal Protection: Selective Enforcement
as a Way to Defeat Discrimination, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 287, 288 (2008) (“The negative
impact of these injunctions can also leave marks on society as a whole.”); see also Hon. Marilyn S.
Kite, Leadership in the Legal Profession: Are Female Lawyers Making Progress?, 34 WYO. LAW. 32, 32
(2011) (“[W]e should be talking about . . . the impact of our legal system on societal problems such
as divorce and child abuse.”); Balancing Children’s Rights into the Divorce Decision, 13 VT. L. REV.
531, 533–43 (1989) (focusing on divorce impacts on children, parents, and society).
227

See Johnson, 608 P.2d at 1303; Balancing Children’s Rights into the Divorce Decision, supra
note 227, at 533–43.
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parent requests the court take a child away from the other parent and place the
child with a guardian affects not only the two parents but the child, the guardian,
the guardian’s family, any siblings of the child, and society as a whole.229 If the
request is based on allegations of abuse or neglect, failing to hear the case on the
merits may result in continued harm to the child and deteriorating physical and
mental conditions that will need to be addressed later.230
Judges should look to the type of relief sought by the litigant to determine
the implications to the community.231 The type of relief sought can help a judge
understand why a plaintiff has brought the case pro se and determine how much
leniency toward the pro se party is necessary to achieve an equitable result.232

3. Fundamental Rights
Another significant consideration to the amount of leniency a court should
extend a pro se litigant is whether a fundamental right is at stake.233 While there
is no finite list of fundamental rights, these rights are defined as rights that are
“sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the nation.”234 Fundamental rights include,
but are not limited to, express rights in the Bill of Rights, privacy, marriage,
procreation, and directing the upbringing and education of one’s children.235
Because these fundamental rights touch the very fabric of our nation, courts
should prioritize adjudicating these claims on their merits rather than dismissing
them for procedural error.236 Issues regarding the health, safety, and upbringing
of children should be a priority of the courts.237 The more important the issue,
the more willing the court should be to award leeway to the pro se pleading.238
Judges should have a greater interest in resolving cases regarding fundamental

229

See Wang, supra note 227, at 288.

See Art Hinshaw, Mediators as Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse: Preserving Mediation’s
Core Values, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 271, 293 (2007) (advocating for rapid responses in child abuse
cases to obtain better results in the child therapy process).
230

231

See supra notes 222–31 and accompanying text.

232

See supra notes 36– 44, 222–31 and accompanying text.

See Bradlow, supra note 40, at 660 (“A liberal construction of the pleadings enables a
court to assess the nature of the interests at stake in the suit and to determine how much further
procedural leniency, if any, is due in the particular case.”).
233

234
Carl Allen Roberts, Jr., Note, Information Discrimination: Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause Should Protect an Individual’s Right to Information, 12 APPALACHIAN J.L. 247, 250–51
(2013) (quoting Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978)).
235

Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2005).

236

See Bradlow, supra note 40, at 660.

237

See supra notes 22–35 and accompanying text.

238

Bradlow, supra note 40, at 660.
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rights quickly and effectively and have less concern for procedural formalities than
they otherwise would in pleadings drafted by lawyers on less important issues.239

4. Likelihood of Success
When considering a motion to dismiss a case, either sua sponte or by the
defendant, judges view the complaint “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff ”
and determine whether “it is certain from the face of the complaint that the
plaintiff cannot assert any fact which would entitle him to relief.”240 This does not
prevent a judge from dismissing a case on other grounds, such as when a pleading
contains a procedural deficiency.241
Judges should be more lenient with claims brought by pro se parties that
have a higher chance of success.242 Judges have an interest in ensuring that justice
is carried out, and cases that are both unlikely to succeed and have additional
pleading complications should not be afforded valuable judicial resources.243
Dismissal of a claim that is unlikely to succeed may incentivize plaintiffs to amend
the pleading, and the amendment alone may increase the chances of success.244
For example, courts should dismiss pro se pleadings without prejudice when they
contain conclusory allegations and bare factual support.245 Plaintiffs can look over
the judge’s reasons for dismissal and amend their complaints, adding additional
factual assertions, thereby increasing their likelihood of success on the merits.246

5. Appropriate Relief Sought
The court should consider whether the relief sought is appropriate for the
situation.247 For example, a mother may have a well-recognized cause of action
See New Mexico ex rel. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Williams (In re R.W.), 772 P.2d 366, 370
(Ct. App. N.M. 1989).
239

In re Estate of Scherer, 2014 WY 129, ¶ 5, 336 P.3d 129, 131 (Wyo. 2014) (quoting
Sinclair v. City of Gillette, 2012 WY 19, ¶ 8, 270 P.3d 644, 646 (Wyo. 2012)).
240

Jessica K. Phillips, Not all Pro Se Litigants are Created Equally: Examining the Need for New
Pro Se Litigant Classifications Through the Lens of the Sovereign Citizen Movement, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1221, 1229 (2016).
241

242

See U.S. Bank, N.A. v. SFR Inv. Pool 1, LLC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1071 (D. Nev. 2015).

See Young v. Leonard, 2006 U.S. Dist. WL 3447662, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2006)
(discussing legislation designed to prevent wasting judicial resources in cases which are unlikely to
succeed); see also Stephan Landsman, Pro Se Litigation, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 231, 237 (2012)
(stating that judges are urged to waive evidentiary and procedural mistakes when appropriate in
obtaining a just result).
243

244
See Slavin v. United States, 403 F.3d 522, 524 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[D]istrict courts may deny
leave to amend if proposed changes would not save complaint.”).
245

Gray, supra note 15, at 126.

246

Id.

White v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 4501328, at *4 (D. Md. Aug.
21, 2013).
247
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for trespass when an ex-spouse wrongfully enters her house to see their child;
however, her request to forbid the ex-spouse from seeing the child again is not a
form of relief that is appropriate under the circumstances. Requests for equitable
relief should be denied if “the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and
will not suffer irreparable injury.”248 Requesting equitable relief when there is an
adequate remedy at law may result in dismissal.249
Although courts have the ability to award different relief than was requested
by the litigant,250 they should be hesitant in accepting pleadings for the simple
fact that a different type of relief may be available.251 Courts should be wary
of substituting their judgment for the judgment of the parties involved when
determining the appropriate relief.252

6. Number of Pleadings Filed
Some litigants request judicial hearings on multiple topics, putting a strain
on judicial resources.253 The reasons for being less lenient with pro se litigants who
file excessive numbers of pleadings are twofold. First, litigants who file excessive
pleadings are more familiar with the system and should better understand what
the court expects of them.254 Second, over-litigious plaintiffs clog the system and
take more than their fair share of judicial resources.255
The court should be more inclined to afford leniency to pro se plaintiffs
who have not been through the system before.256 They are, after all, less likely to
understand the process.257 A court’s patience understandably wears thin when it

248

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992).

249

See Hoffman v. Stevens, 177 F.Supp. 898, 904 (M.D. Pa. 1959).

See Square D Co. v. Scott Elec. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. WL 3488809, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Nov.
14, 2007).
250

251

See Nebraska ex rel. B.M v. Brian F., 846 N.W.2d 257, 267 (Neb. 2014).

252

See id.

See Ardis v. Pensacola State Coll., 128 So.3d 260, 264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (holding
that courts have the authority to issue an injunction prohibiting further pro se filings where a
litigant’s excessive filings interfere with administering justice).
253

See Richard L. Weber, No Greater Rights, N.Y. ST. B.J., July-Aug. 2007, at 11, 12–13. A key
question in litigation is to determine whether a pro se litigant is abusing the process. Id. Litigants
who file excessive and repetitive lawsuits are entitled less leniency by the court to curb waste of
judicial resources. Id.
254

255
Id.; Landsman, supra note 243, at 240 (“The often-repeated claim is that pro se litigants
slow the clearing of dockets, delay the progress of cases, and increase administrative costs.”).
256
See Davidson v. Flynn, 32 F.3d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1994) (declining to afford litigant the
leniency normally afforded pro se parties based on his “extremely litigious” nature and familiarity
with the system).
257

See id.
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sees filings by the same litigant with repeated procedural errors, especially when
the court previously warned the litigant of the same type of error.258 Judicial
resources are better spent elsewhere to ensure everyone has equal access to the
courts, rather than consumed scouring a pleading by a repeat party in an attempt
to ascertain a claim in an otherwise nearly incomprehensible filing.259

7. Potential for Prejudice
Finally, judges should consider how dismissing a pleading might harm the
party attempting to bring forth an action.260 There are a variety of ways parties
could be prejudiced based on dismissal including issues regarding the statute of
limitations, health and safety concerns to the party or those associated with the
party, and the risk of losing jurisdiction over parties or witnesses.261 For example,
a necessary witness to a child abuse allegation may plan to permanently leave
the country in the near future. If the court has knowledge of this information, it
weighs toward granting more leniency and accepting the pleading as sufficient in
order to hear the case at a time the witness can attend.262 Delaying the proceeding
to a time where the court’s subpoena power can no longer compel witness
participation may be highly prejudicial to the litigant’s case.263
When faced with these issues, a court’s failure to be sufficiently lenient to a
pro se party could be fatal to a litigant’s case.264 In the interest of justice, courts
should be more lenient to pro se parties when rejecting the pleading would lead to
a substantial risk of prejudice.265

VI. CONCLUSION
Pro se litigants often face a variety of problems in the judicial system,
including lack of access to attorneys,266 lack of understanding of the relevant law

258

See Galleher v. Astrue, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 789207, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 26, 2014).

259

See Weber, supra note 254, at 12–13.
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See Onodera v. Dowis, 2011 U.S. Dist. WL 3666748, at *8 (D. Colo. Jun. 6, 2011).

ROBERT E. BENSON, ARBITRATION LAW IN COLORADO § 9.9 (2013); Zagano v. Fordham
Univ., 900 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1990); Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058, 1063
(Utah 1998).
261

262

See Langer v. Courier News, 186 N.W. 102, 102 (N.D. 1921).

See Gonzalez v. Naviera Neptuno A.A., 832 F.2d 876, 881 (5th Cir. 1987) (recognizing
prejudice in the inability to compel witness testimony when witnesses were located in Peru).
263

See Castillo v. Cook Cty. Mail Room Dep’t, 990 F.2d 304, 307 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding
the district court’s dismissal for a pro se litigant’s naming an entity which could not be sued
was error).
264
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See supra notes 260–65 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 36–45 and accompanying text.
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and procedure,267 and the inability to get help from the court due to constraints
of judicial impartiality.268 The majority of these pro se litigants are found in the
family law context and face additional unique difficulties.269 Resolving family law
cases fairly is exceptionally important to society, as these issues regard intimate
family life, the raising of children, and the health and welfare of children.270
Courts struggle to deal with pro se litigants based on the conflict between
providing fair hearings and remaining impartial.271 Currently, it is unclear how
courts should treat pro se pleadings in the state of Wyoming.272 Two conflicting
lines of cases allow judges to either treat the pro se litigant as they would a competent
attorney or allow them some amount of leniency.273 No published opinion in
Wyoming explains the appropriate amount of leniency when interpreting
these pleadings.274
The lack of clarity leaves excessively broad levels of discretion to trial
court judges.275 With this much discretion, similar pleadings might be treated
differently depending on when and where they are filed.276 A compilation
of philosophies from other jurisdictions provides some guidance on how to
deal with these litigants, but there is no set standard for what constitutes
appropriate treatment.277
The due process requirements of jurisdiction and service of process are
essential to a pleading.278 Pro se pleadings that do not meet these requirements are
subject to immediate dismissal.279 Wyoming precedent also dictates that dismissal
may be appropriate without reaching the merits when a pleading is drafted using
excessively abusive and vulgar language.280 Once a court recognizes it can proceed
with a claim, it may then have to consider whether minor procedural errors are
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See supra notes 161– 68 and accompanying text.

268

See supra notes 89–90, 200 –02 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 20–58 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 20–58 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 89–90, 200– 02 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 63–81 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 63–81 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 99–112 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 99–112 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 128–56 and accompanying text.

278

See supra notes 181–201 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 188–201 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 202– 06 and accompanying text.
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fatal to the claim, or whether to make allowances based on the litigant’s pro se
status.281 Each pro se case is different and requires a variety of considerations.282
Adopting a factor approach when interpreting pro se pleadings would lead to
more consistency in the system, providing both judges and pro se litigants with
more guidance. The factor approach would both give judges more direction on
what to consider and give the appellate court a more thorough record to review,
without completely sacrificing judicial discretion.283 A suggested list of factors to
consider include: the court’s ability to determine a cause of action, the type of
relief sought, whether fundamental rights are at stake, the likelihood of success,
the appropriateness of the relief sought, the number of pleadings filed by the
litigant, and the likelihood the party will suffer prejudice if the court does not act
on the pleading.284 Using these factors, the court is more likely to achieve a just
result and grant the appropriate amount of leniency to pro se litigants.285
While this comment views the issue through the lens of a pro se litigant
in the family law context, none of it means to suggest that courts should not
analyze these factors in other areas of pro se litigation. Striking a balance between
neutrality and hearing cases on their merits is often a difficult line to draw.286 With
more direction and the use of factors, judges can achieve consistent, equitable
results.287 Although this is not a comprehensive solution to the pro se problem
faced in the judiciary, it is a step toward creating a more certain, informative, and
equitable system.
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